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Dubjection: A Node 
(Reflections on web-conferencing, McLuhan, and intellectual property) 
 
 
Media always already provide the appearances of spectres. 
 - Friedrich Kittler (12) 
 
Having extended or translated our central nervous system into the electromagnetic 
technology, it is but a further stage to transfer our consciousness to the computer world as 
well. 
- Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (89) 
 
If consciousness should, ultimately, prove to be uploadable, corporations will hold 
patents on the software that will embrace our minds.  
- Chris Dewdney (178) 
 
What is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way. 
- Jacques Derrida (18) 
 
 
When Prof. Dr. Martin Kuester accepted my presentation for the Universität Marburg Canadian 
Studies Centre’s May 2011 conference McLuhan’s Global Village Today, I was pleased to be 
included in this centennial celebration of Canada’s foremost media scholar. When it looked like I 
would not be able to attend, Dr. Kuester gamely agreed to allow my proposed remote 
presentation of the talk via digital web-conferencing. Following a successful test run of the 
technology conducted a week before the proceedings, on May 13th I presented my paper: 
“McLuhan’s ‘Frankepheme’ of Technology,” a close reading of the discourse of technology in 
McLuhan’s writing. When Dr. Kuester circulated the call for expanded contributions to a volume 
of the proceedings, I was pained to decline: mine was reserved for other publication plans. But 
when I proposed, instead, a kind of meta-commentary about my talk’s McLuhanesque mediation, 
and the implications of this mediation, Dr. Kuester - again very gamely - expressed interest. He 
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has been an exceedingly good sport to field the curve-ball contributions I have thrown at him, 
and I thank him for the opportunity to share these reflections as part of this collection’s colloquy. 
What does it mean to say that I presented a paper at the conference? I was neither present 
at the event, nor presenting a paper, as denoted by academic tradition, so much as orchestrating 
an audio-visual “presentation,” at once a performance and a recording. I delivered my talk 
remotely, using the Adobe corporation’s Connect program, one of many web-conferencing or 
“webinar” programs that provide multimedia-rich teleconferencing services for business firms, 
educational institutions, and other organizational clients. For my purposes here, it’s worth 
mentioning that the university I work at, Athabasca University (AU), deals entirely in distance 
education, much like the UK’s Open University. We have a couple of staff and student-service 
offices, but no physical campus. 
I decided to propose a web-conference version of my talk for a couple of reasons.  
Firstly, I was familiar with web-conferencing - and its predecessor, teleconferencing. The 
first teleconference I attended was a class meeting of the McLuhan Centre's seminar on “Media, 
Mind, and Society” that I took as a grad student at the University of Toronto in 1996; Derrick de 
Kerckhove, the instructor and then Centre director, led the class remotely while he was abroad. 
Suffice to say, the medium of that meeting was as much discussed as the subject matter’s 
message; de Kerckhove had speculated on the social implications of videoconferencing in his 
then-new book The Skin of Culture (1995), predicting its centrality to telecommuting (not to 
mention its creation of “an enormous live sex video market” [60]). Fast-forwarding to 2008, I 
was introduced to web-conferencing while at the University of Western Ontario, when I used 
Wimba, owned by the proprietary LMS firm Blackboard, to present a paper for a symposium on 
postcolonial popular culture at the University of Otago in New Zealand; it was in that paper that 
I began work on what I have dubbed the dubject:  
 
a work of being in the age of ubiquitous technological reproduction; a practice of 
uploading and globally distributing identity; a practice of mediatizing subjectivity itself, 
transcribing the improvisational experience of corporeal embodiment into the archival 
fixity of recording media. The dubject is a self recording and recorded, dubbed and 
doubled; a doppelgänger self whose ‘live’ presence becomes radically supplemented by 
its recordings and representations. (McCutcheon, “Frankenstein” 735) 
 
When I moved to AU, then, it was no surprise to find web-conferencing software in 
regular use. AU’s former Canada Research Chair in Distance Education, Terry Anderson, claims 
to have organized the world’s first online conference, which took place in 1994 and pre-dated the 
World Wide Web: 
 
The Calgary-based event for the International Council of Distance Education lasted three 
weeks, featured six keynote speakers whose talks were delivered in text format, and 
consisted largely of participants sending and receiving about 20 e-mails a day. More than 
1,000 people attended, quite a feat in those nascent days of the web, when there were 
multiple networks instead of one superhighway, requiring participants to use a variety of 
methods to access the conference. (Waldman ¶11) 
 
Clearly, online conference technology has come a long way since. (The extent to which 
it’s stimulated a digital live porn market is a question beyond this paper’s scope.) Dozens of 
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vendors offer web-conferencing solutions, as discovered by AU’s committee struck to select a 
new one for official adoption by our university. We decided on Adobe Connect, for one very 
important reason, among others: it was the only shortlisted solution whose vendor could supply 
domestic storage of AU data - that is, in Canada, instead of on foreign servers. Data storage on 
American servers became a cause for concern for the committee, amidst discussions about how 
any and all US-stored data is open to the extraordinary search and surveillance powers afforded 
to the US government by the October 2001 Patriot Act. In contrast, Blackboard’s privacy policy 
informs EU residents about its terms for data storage “in countries outside the EU, including the 
United States”; similarly, Cisco Webex’s terms of service specify that US and California laws 
govern all “contracting entities” in the Americas. 
A more mundane reason we adopted Connect is the software’s robustness and user-
friendliness. But no software is so robust it can be taken for granted to work, so Dr. Kuester, 
Christian Pauls, and I held a test meeting using the software a week before the conference. 
During our brief online talk, I asked Dr. Kuester what McLuhan would have thought of web-
conferencing. “I think he would say it’s too hot,” he replied. 
Wondering what McLuhan might make of web-conferencing - and whether a 
demonstration of it would be apt for a McLuhan centennial event - was the other reason I thought 
of proposing it. These reflections will be elaborated in what follows, after a few further details to 
set the scene and describe the media involved. At the time of the conference, I was in transit. A 
family emergency had taken me out of my home office in Edmonton, to the other side of the 
country: specifically, the house of my parents-in-laws’ neighbours in the small town of 
Thornbury, Ontario, where we stayed so my spouse could assist her terminally ill mother. 
Contrary to de Kerckhove’s prediction that video-conferencing would re-orient “architecture and 
development” to “communications accessibility rather than in terms of roadway and hydro 
infrastructures” (60), high-speed access to Internet service remains a colonially-conditioned 
scarcity for much of Canada outside the major urban centres - especially for First Nations 
communities. But, thankfully, these family friends did have a high-speed connection in the 
house, which is how I hard-wired a link to the conference in Marburg and began transmission. 
That transmission consisted of a digital slideshow, video images of my talking head and 
of the room of delegates in Marburg, and my microphoned voice, as I spoke the text of my paper. 
Since I had copied my argument from a word processor into the program’s Notes field, visible 
only at my end of the connection, to refer to it as a “paper” is somewhat skewed, a skeuomorph: 
“an object or feature copying the design of a similar artefact in another material” (OED) - like 
the “floppy disk” icon that still means “save,” even though floppy disks are now mostly obsolete 
toxic waste. From my position as presenter, the screen showed the digital slideshow at left, with 
notes, and, at right, my video image as well as that of the audience. The audience had the 
approximately the same view, minus the presentation notes, whose absence made for a larger 
display of the slideshow. Figure 1 shows a screen-captured image of the Connect interface, taken 
from the recording of the talk; it shows the audience view. This recording is now archived in my 
institutional Connect account; it can be called up, replayed and paused, and distributed as a link 
with a password. 
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Fig. 1. Screen-captured frame of Adobe Connect interface, recorded 13 May 2011 
 
Despite the test run, the system in Marburg encountered audio difficulty, which Pauls and 
the panel moderator nimbly worked around. I found it hard to read the audience’s engagement at 
that time, but got a better sense of it afterwards, in fielding a question from the floor. And later 
that month, when I encountered Dr. Kuester at Congress (Canada’s national convention of the 
Humanities and social sciences), he assured me that my talk had come through clearly, and was a 
topic of at least some conversation among the delegates. “The [Canadian] ambassador liked it,” 
he said, which is how I learned the ambassador had been in the audience. (You see what I mean 
in saying the audience was hard to read at the time.)  
I have detailed the context, set-up, and delivery of this particular web-conference in order 
to extrapolate from the experiment some of its cultural functions and material implications in 
three interconnected contexts: the idea of the dubject in relation to “subject technics” theory 
(Apter ¶4); McLuhan’s media theory; and intellectual property regulation. The latter two 
contexts both remain conspicuously absent from theories of digital subjectivity and space, which 
do extensively treat problems of remediated “extension” and corporate commodification in other 
respects, but not with significant reference either to McLuhan’s ideas, or to the formidable and 
fast-changing intellectual property regulations that underwrite the whole field of new media 
culture - the media and messages - which give rise to theories of “the subject in technics” in the 
first place. The aim of my extrapolations here is to address these absences. 
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Like other digital media, such as social networks (Twitter, Facebook), web-conferencing 
blurs the lines between performance and recording, between presence and representation. 
Dubbing the subject formed between these lines the “dubject,” 
 
I have suggested the figure of the dubject as a postmodern form of mediatized and 
remediated subjectivity, assembled through technologies of mechanical reproduction, and 
distributed through networks of electronic distribution, that blur the boundaries between 
performance and recording, consumer and commodity, the organic self and its 
technological others. […] Read as a symptom of Canada’s colonial experience of various 
cultural and media empires, dubjectivity remixes the individual citizen in a manner not 
unlike that in which Canadian multicultural policy reimagines the national citizenry: as 
the commodity of a global market, a product of competing intellectual property claims, a 
consumer of media consumed by media. (McCutcheon, “Towards” [236-39]) 
 
As I have started thinking about it, the dubject differs from analogous models of the subject in 
technics - Donna Haraway’s cyborg, Apter’s “avatarity” (¶1) - more because of the cultural 
imperialist context that conditions its emergence than because of its structural or techno-
prosthetic dimensions. The idea of the dubject emerges from my research on a specific cultural 
tradition in Canada’s “technological nationalism” (see Charland, Kroker). As theorized by 
McLuhan, as dramatized by McLuhanesque, medially self-reflexive texts like David 
Cronenberg’s 1982 film Videodrome and William Gibson’s 1984 novel Neuromancer, and even 
as lived by artists like Glenn Gould and Margaret Atwood, dubjection entails a technological 
doubling and spacing of the self.  
But unlike Haraway’s provisionally Utopian cyborg or Apter’s avatar, a “prosthetic 
extension of desubjectivated agency” (¶8), the dubject takes shape under conditions more 
specifically postcolonial than generally postmodern, as a “symptom of Canada’s perennially 
imperilled sovereignty” and “an ambivalent product of cultural globalization and its corporate 
steering”: that is, echoing Atwood, the dubject represents “a kind of survival” (McCutcheon, 
"Frankenstein" 739).  
In illustrating the Connect interface, Fig. 1 also illustrates a mise en abyme of framed 
images of the dubject: framed by the page, the Connect interface frames a Powerpoint slide; the 
slide frames a still image from Videodrome; this image, in turn, frames a TV screen image of the 
character Brian O’Blivion, who represents an open parody of Marshall McLuhan, and an 
emblematic figure of the dubject: 
 
Throughout the film, O’Blivion only ever appears on a TV screen. […] Towards the 
film’s end, we learn that O’Blivion has died before the film’s diegetic time - before the 
interview - and has “lived” for some time only as a private library of videotapes. “This is 
him,” O’Blivion’s daughter-turned-curator explains to [protagonist] Renn. “This is all 
that’s left. […] He made thousands of them, sometimes three or four [tapes] a day. I keep 
him alive as best I can. […] He became convinced that public life on television was more 
real than private life in the flesh. He wasn’t afraid to let his body die.” (McCutcheon, 
“Towards” [236]) 
 
A scholar, an inventor (we learn O’Blivion had invented the transformative “Videodrome 
signal”), a corporate subcontractor (he invented the signal for a multinational conglomerate), a 
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philanthropist (his organization provides TV access to the homeless), and a ghost in the machine: 
as the disembodied embodiment of these converging and conflicting local and global interests, 
O’Blivion serves as a representative dubject for Canadian media culture.  
As the image of the dubject develops in the darkroom of Canada’s postcolonial media 
culture, so does it reflect a specifically situated engagement with theory. Apter usefully 
summarizes the canons of scholarship on subjectivity and technology, canons that in her survey 
consist almost entirely of continental thinkers, such as Heidegger, Benjamin, Lacan, Derrida, 
Deleuze, and Kittler (¶3). While some of these thinkers inform my theory of the dubject, so does 
McLuhan, who is strangely absent from Apter’s canon of authorities on technology - except 
perhaps as a spectral, intellectual shadow behind some of them: Kittler, Deleuze, Derrida (see 
Cavell xvi).  
As mentioned in my talk at Marburg, McLuhan’s media theory makes use of spectral, 
sometimes monstrous figures to represent changing media ecologies - and media-changed 
subjectivities. McLuhan’s fundamental conception of technology as “extension,” as radical 
prosthesis, subtends his figurations of media’s reconfigurations of social space as 
reconfigurations of subjectivity. This correspondence recurs throughout Understanding Media, 
from its introductory projections for “the technological simulation of consciousness” (5) to 
passages like that in Chapter 20, where in one paragraph McLuhan refers to “electronic man,” 
“Typographic Man,” and “Graphic Man” (259). McLuhan represents such subjects in epochal, 
universalizing terms; however, as discussed in several studies (Kroker 61; see also Cavell, 
Moss), McLuhan’s ideas emerge from a specific, postcolonial “Canadian stance” (Cavell xvii), 
even as they speak to general, globalized and postmodern concerns. One well-known illustration 
of this is the strong influence on McLuhan of Harold Innis, whose work engaged issues of 
empire more extensively, and in a more explicitly Canadian context. Accordingly, McLuhan's 
ideas contextualize and texture the theory of the dubject: “in McLuhan’s terms (1964, 99-100), 
Canadian dubjectivity entails both the technological ‘extension of our own bodies and senses’ 
and the ‘lease [of] our central nervous systems to various corporations’, both media bricolage 
and a redistribution that is at once infiltration and dispossession” (McCutcheon 739). 
To take up, in depth, McLuhan’s suggestive reference here to the “corporate lease” of 
“central nervous systems” in the context of intellectual property, we will first have to flesh out 
some of the broader articulations between McLuhan’s media ecology and the theory of the 
dubject, taking the web-conference presentation as illustrative case of dubjectivity’s 
simultaneously postmodern and postcolonial doubling and spacing the self. 
As Richard Cavell extensively documents, space is an overarching, organizing 
problematic for understanding McLuhan's oeuvre: “McLuhan's notion of communication 
combines a spatial model with a sensory one, McLuhan insisting that media were extensions of 
our senses” (6). The conceptual centrality of space - especially the immersive, multi-vectored 
idea of acoustic space - to McLuhan’s theory can helpfully problematize the spatial and temporal 
experience of webinar performance and recording as occupation and displacement, anchoring 
and movement. On the day of the proceedings, I wasn’t at Marburg, or at AU - or even at the 
same place where we had tested the Connect interface, just the week before. If the conjunction at 
connotes a sense of place, of position - a humanistic, common-sense expression of live, 
embodied presence - then in that sense, I was somewhere, of course: I was at a neighbour’s 
house. But that place became neither here nor there, so to speak, for the duration of my 
attendance at the conference. Would it be more precise to say that, at that time, I was “@” a 
number of spaces at the same time? I was operating an AU-owned console, jacked into a family 
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friend’s high-speed Internet service; I was streaming - in “real time,” which is not the same as 
“live” - a bandwidth-heavy signal from a laptop in a Canadian farmhouse to an A/V system in a 
German town hall; and, additionally, I was logged in to my Twitter and web-mail accounts (one 
for interactive back-channel discussion, the other for quick correspondence in case of technical 
difficulties). What’s more, I had already uploaded a pre-recording of the presentation - another 
precautionary back-up in case of technical difficulties - to my Connect server. So a version of my 
presentation - which meant, as far as the audience was concerned, a version of my self-
presentation - was standing by: a recorded double of my live self, kept in reserve, ready to stand 
in for me, on my command. 
These multiple corporeal and digital selves constituted a particular node of my 
dubjectivity at the time: a node as in a point in a network, but also as a usefully layered word that 
means a knot, an entanglement; a point of significance (or at least, in this case, of signification), 
a concretion (a materialization); a junction. If my dubjectivity materialized as a node, understood 
through these entangled, multiple meanings, then what networks did this node of dubjectivity - 
did I - occupy? For all the talk about virtualized or “cloud” data storage, these clouds are, of 
course, rooms and buildings full of server racks. Twitter’s servers are in San Francisco and some 
other big American cities. Google, which is secretive about its physical-plant data storage 
operations, has servers around the world, but most of the known ones are in the continental USA; 
at least one is in Toronto (Miller). I was connected to my university accounts and data, stored in 
Athabasca, and to my Adobe account and data, stored on the company’s servers in Toronto, 
where I’m from. My image and voice projected into the Marburg town hall, racing unplumbed 
lengths of cable and unknown airborne frequencies, translated into strings of ones and zeroes as 
dense and complex as protein chains. Routed and rerouted through data centres and ISP 
addresses across the Atlantic (and quite possibly elsewhere), my dubjected presence traversed 
any number of relays and channels in the global IT network, less a village, certainly, than a vast 
electric ocean.  
McLuhan had not suggested the “global village” to project a Utopian future, of course, 
but to describe his dystopian present, the violently turbulent geopolitical world of the 1960s. 
Conversely, his ideas about computing - grounded in the late 1960s reality of computers and 
ARPAnet, the prototypical Internet spawned by a curious coupling between counter-culture 
programmers and the US military - have retrospectively gained the distinction of foresight, a 
distinction sometimes exorbitantly accorded the status of prescience or prophecy, as in his 
retroactive 1993 “canonization” by Wired magazine (Cavell xvi). As Cavell rightly cautions, it 
would be “a disservice to call him (as many do) a prophet,” which would “limit his significance 
to having predicted the present moment” when his greater legacy was “to articulate the dynamics 
of technological change” (xvii).  
And yet it is perhaps in McLuhan’s speculations on networked computing that we find 
the most vividly and strangely imagined articulation of global, techno-cultural transformation: 
“might not our current translation of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information seem 
to make of the entire globe, and of the human family, a single consciousness?” (90). 
Understanding Media offers a series of variations on this theme: “The computer, in short, 
promises by technology a Pentecostal condition of universal understanding and unity” (114). The 
techno-transcendental Utopianism of this theme must be viewed as a colour print developed from 
his photo-negative image of the dystopian present - a “maelstrom” of change for which he 
privately expressed “total personal dislike” (“Playboy” 267). In The Gutenberg Galaxy, 
something of McLuhan’s profound, conflicted ambivalence towards technological change comes 
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across in his suggestion that “the externalization of our senses creates [...] a technological brain 
for the world.” Unlike the framing of such images in the later book Understanding Media, here 
he gives the image a sardonic, negative charge: “Instead of tending towards a vast Alexandrian 
library the world has become a computer, an electronic brain, exactly as in an infantile piece of 
science fiction” (44). In Technology and the Canadian Mind (1984), Arthur Kroker’s reading of 
McLuhan’s “technological humanism [...] at the forward edge of a fundamental ‘paradigm shift’ 
in human consciousness” (63) shrewdly encapsulates this temporal and tonal tension in his work: 
 
McLuhan was a technological humanist of the blood: his conviction, repeated time and 
again, was that if we are to recover a new human possibility it will not be “outside” the 
technological experience, but must, of necessity, be “inside” the field of technology. [...] 
If only the media of communication could be made supportive of the “creative process” 
in ordinary human perception: then technological society would, finally, be transformed 
into a wonderful opportunity for the “incarnation” of human experience. (64) 
 
On this account, McLuhan’s ideas about the potential of information technology and 
biotechnology - and their intermingling - come to resemble the discourse of the “technological 
singularity,” the view, espoused chiefly by Ray Kurzweil in books like The Singularity is Near 
(2005), that the human species stands on the cusp of a radically post-human future to be brought 
about by present efforts to engender self-aware artificial intelligences embodied in technological 
forms. Kurzweil presently expects the singularity’s realization in 2045 (Grossman).  
McLuhan’s projection of “a new human possibility” like the singularity has been widely 
explored in Canadian science fiction, from the acknowledged McLuhanesque “cyberspace” of 
Neuromancer, to Robert J. Sawyer’s WWW series (in which the web itself awakens), to Peter 
Watts’ Maelstrom (2001), whose title recalls McLuhan’s penchant for Poe’s “Descent into the 
Maelstrom” (1845); Watts’ novel satirically postulates “spam” e-mails becoming autonomous 
and turning the Internet into a digital “meatgrinder” of evolution in fast-forward. McLuhan’s 
extrapolations of connected computing have also been taken up in nonfiction. De Kerckhove’s 
Skin of Culture offers many variations on a McLuhanesque theme of dubjectivity, for instance in 
suggesting how accessing the Internet “amounts to spreading oneself in cyberspace and out of 
time” amidst a “common cognitive environment where the individual user, at once a consumer 
and a producer, becomes a kind of ubiquitous, floating neural/nodal entity” (203-4). A dubject, 
then? Toronto poet and McLuhan Institute Fellow Chris Dewdney’s 1995 book Last Flesh: Life 
in the Transhuman Era adapts McLuhan’s “baroque artistic imagination” (Kroker 61) and his 
restless, “probing” method to survey the contemporary technoscape - which, like that of de 
Kerckhove, is the cyberdelic, VR-helmeted dawn of the Web in the mid-1990s. Dewdney 
speculates at once more freely and more practically on the opportunities and challenges of 
“uploading consciousness” (169). On one hand, Dewdney envisions deeply strange futures, like 
“the awesome, perhaps frightening, prospect of eternal existence”: a premise Cory Doctorow 
adopted for his first novel, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (2003). On the other hand - and 
with echoes, albeit somewhat different, in Doctorow’s novel - Dewdney considers the 
commodifications and corporate exploitations of “uploading consciousness.” In Down and Out, a 
“post-scarcity economy” has spelled the end of corporate copyright control. In Last Flesh, the 
posthuman future looks more like Gibson’s corporate neo-feudalism. Pursuing the idea quoted as 
an epigraph at the start of this essay, Dewdney wryly suggests that “we may, in the future, be 
able to realize an aphorism that is now only an allegory, by being able to literally sell our souls to 
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a corporation” (178), and “all kinds of human skills, perceptions, memories and experiences 
might also become marketable in the ultimate intellectual-properties marketplace” (180).  
Pursuing the licensing and marketing implications of these speculations leads Dewdney 
to conclude that “the spectre of a corporate monopoly over posthuman consciousness is, clearly, 
nightmarish” (181). And here is the key to recognizing the send-up in Dewdney’s unbound 
futurism: for McLuhan, such a spectre was already looming over human consciousness, in the 
nightmarish, postwar global village. In its maelstrom of electronic sound and nuclear fury, too 
many citizens were already busy selling their souls to corporations, as The Mechanical Bride 
(1951) argues; and, as Cavell observes, its acoustic space of electronic media already 
“challenged received notions of subjectivity and the limits of the (extended) self,” long before 
the cyberspace of digital media (qtd. in Moss 171). 
At the risk of decontextualizing and dehistoricizing my own tentative theory, we can look 
further back into the history of culture and technology for suggestive precursors of the dubject. 
Friedrich Kittler finds subjectivity first simulated in nineteenth-century analogue recording 
devices that could capture the Real: “Once the technological differentiation of optics, acoustics, 
and writing exploded Gutenberg’s writing monopoly around 1880, the fabrication of so-called 
Man became possible. His essence escapes into apparatuses. Machines take over functions of the 
central nervous system” (16). Kittler also notes that, in 1890, the Columbia Phonograph 
Company promoted the use of record players to consumers for composing music out of their 
favourite songs - making mash-ups, in effect (35) - a strategy understandable for an industry in 
its infancy, facing the entrenched sheet-music establishment, but one virtually unthinkable for 
the big labels today. Looking further back, we could read John Milton’s image of book burning 
as murder in Areopagitica (1644), or the inquisition of library books in Cervantes’ Don Quixote 
(1605-15) as prefigures of dubjection, exemplars of a long-standing literary conceit of books as 
“the preserved essences of authors” (Rose 29). The historical “parade of the subjects” (Apter ¶2), 
from early modernity to postmodernity to the singularity, suggests, in theory, that traditional 
humanistic subjectivity has always already been a project of representation.  
In this essay I don’t wish to claim that the dubject is either a harbinger of technology’s 
awakening consciousness, on one hand, or a mere metaphor, on the other. But somewhere 
between these extremes, the dubject may linger for a time in the uncanny valley. In an article 
about what Internet users do or don’t do about “the afterlife of their digital selves,” Rob Walker 
identifies a growing social problem - and an emerging service sector for “digital estate 
planning,” illustrated in stories of relatives locked out of loved ones’ e-mail accounts for which 
companies won’t release passwords, stories of DIY heirloom and scrapbook curation for the 
deceased by friends and fans. What emerges in Walker’s account is a curious contradiction: 
between the predominant digital tools - which “privilege the moment” and so create “fragile 
digital selves [that] represent a potential loss” to future history - and their foundational 
cyberspace fantasies of an “age-proof, sickness-proof” and “upload[able]” self. To investigate 
this problem, Walker draws on Margaret Wertheim’s critique of these fantasies of the 
“cybersoul,” their substitution of a religious transcendent signified for a technological one:  
 
Wertheim, it should be noted, saw the cybersoul notion as both flawed and troubling, and 
I would agree. Life’s essence reduced to captured data is an uninspiring, and 
unconvincing, resolution to the centuries-old question of where, in mind and in body, the 
self resides. (¶13) 
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And yet this “uninspiring” image of a self as captured data perhaps best describes the dubject, as 
dramatized by O’Blivion, as fictionalized in Gibson’s “constructs” -  “hardwired ROM cassette 
replicating a dead man’s skills, obsessions” (77) - and as lived by Canadians like pianist Glenn 
Gould (see McCutcheon, “Towards”) and transgender performance artist Nina Arsenault, who 
approaches both social media and her own body as sites of her creative, transformative practice. 
Dubjection is a particular practice of remediated representation as self-representation and 
survivalist retreat: a practice determined historically by the more or less simultaneous emergence 
of analogue recording and the Canadian nation, Canada’s ensuing technological nationalism and 
the countervailing forces of (mostly British and American) cultural imperialism, and the late 
intensification of Canada’s involvements and interventions in globalization, including the present 
reconfigurations of global intellectual property law.   
By embodying the dialectic of propriety and appropriation in remediation, the dubject 
amplifies McLuhan’s under-appreciated but significant comments on “the corporate,” and on 
issues of intellectual property. McLuhan makes references to “corporate” entities and practices 
that sometimes connote a social collective not a business model. For instance, in The Medium is 
the Massage (1967), McLuhan argues that television “invest[s] an occasion with the character of 
corporate participation. It involves an entire population in a ritual process” (125). But rereading 
McLuhan at the end of a decade in which “the dominant institution of our time” (The 
Corporation) loudly asserted both the propriety of its privilege and its capacity for catastrophe 
makes it difficult to read remarks on “the corporate” without hearing a double entendre, with 
significant bearing for a theory of dubjection.   
In Understanding Media, McLuhan uses the term in both ways, letting them reflect each 
other’s meaning. One statement in particular clarifies the business end of his terminology, and 
resonates profoundly with a globalized copyright regime that, for over a decade now, has been 
scrambling to keep up with - and striving to suppress - new media’s transformations of culture 
and identity: 
 
Once we have surrendered our senses and nervous systems to the private manipulation of 
those who would try to benefit from taking a lease on our eyes and ears and nerves, we 
don't really have any rights left. Leasing our eyes and ears and nerves to commercial 
interests is like handing over the common speech to a private corporation. (99) 
 
Wary of the implications of the “lease [of] our central nervous systems to various corporations” 
(100), McLuhan gives the example of a corporation seeking to monopolize “common speech” as 
though it is a patent absurdity; but of course the corporate enclosure of common speech is now 
precisely what is taking place - whether we understand by “common speech” the public domain, 
or the rights of fair dealing and fair use, or the right to hyperlink without liability for 
infringement (a right taken for granted until very recently decided in Canadian law; see Crookes 
v. Newton). Given the arsenal and aggression of this “second enclosure movement” to confine 
and confiscate the global cultural commons, no theory of the dubject is adequate without 
understanding its simultaneous contingency on and rejection of the lease of this self to “private 
manipulation” and “commercial interests.”  
One form this lease takes is simply in how a user creates value for a corporate social 
network at no cost to it, simply by freely posting and sharing personal content, selections of 
which are then traded by a company with its affiliates. Facebook caused widespread concern in 
2009 amidst communications that its terms of service granted the network the rights to content 
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left in closed accounts. Facebook representatives scrambled to clarify that the company does not 
claim copyright in users’ content (see Walters). Google’s and Twitter’s terms of service 
statements clearly assure the user that she or he retains copyright in one’s content (e.g. e-mails, 
tweets, and links - though not necessarily the linked sites, if owned by third parties, of course).  
Another form the “lease” takes is more structural, in how networking and communication 
are designed, organized, and limited by corporations and their extremely narrow market interests. 
Extrapolating from the “microblog” design of Twitter, I have argued (and tweeted) that the 
service’s textual economy - its 140-character limit - normalizes for communication the neoliberal 
ideology that fiscal austerity is the only way to run a public service (McCutcheon, 
“Ipsographing”). Reflecting on the studiously depoliticized, hyper-consumerist layout of 
Facebook, Tobias van Veen argues that “the technics of perception in which uncitizens engage 
with the social network aligns desire with socially networked consumerism” (“Technics”). 
Adobe’s Connect program is designed for mainly for business and educational “solutions”; it 
seems odd, on this account, that two such different social institutions can use the same means to 
serve their different ends. In other words, as McLuhan’s maxim that the medium is the message 
reminds us, every digital tool or service determines and to an extent dictates the order of its 
discourse. 
Elsewhere in Understanding Media, McLuhan makes a related remark about the 
transformation of commodities into information (56) that maybe makes more sense today as 
chiasmus, if we add that information - like user-generated content - has become a staple post-
industrial commodity. He also notes the imposition of uniform pricing around the world by 
cultural-industry companies - which has since been argued by Jack Bishop as a principal cause of 
media piracy in developing economies (102). Significantly, McLuhan’s salutary statement on 
copyright is in The Medium is the Massage, the populist paperback digest of his theses; his 
statement is, characteristically, both explanatory and emancipatory. Anticipating Foucault and 
Mark Rose, McLuhan explains that the rise of print occasioned the advent of the “author” 
function and the privatization of “intellectual effort” as property; thus, “the idea of copyright 
[…] was born” (122). Then comes the emancipatory part: 
 
Xerography - every man’s brain-picker - heralds the times of instant publishing. Anybody 
can now become both author and publisher. Take any books on any subject and custom-
make your own book by simply Xeroxing a chapter from this one, a chapter from that one 
- instant steal! (123) 
 
Advocating something like the cut-up method of Dadaist and Beat aesthetics, McLuhan 
concludes from the cut-and-mix possibilities of ubiquitous copying technologies that “people are 
less and less convinced of the importance of self-expression” (123). Digital media have both 
confirmed and refuted this claim: through them, multimedia remixing has been democratized to 
the point that Canada’s forthcoming [new] copyright legislation includes a remix clause 
sanctioning its noncommercial practice. On the other hand, the entertainment and “content” 
companies and their intermediaries have raised to a histrionic pitch its [their] evocations of the 
Romantic figure of the self-expressive artist, and its equally simplistic counterpart the pirate, in 
order to disingenuously represent their corporate rights-holder interests as those of suffering 
artists.       
The impact of ubiquitous, networked, digital copying on intellectual property regulation 
has prompted a global mess of law struggling to keep pace with - or rein in - technology, via 
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reactionary legislation (the DMCA) and agreements (ACTA) that more than anything else just 
criminalize more and more computer users and non-infringing computer uses. Corporate device, 
software, and content producers routinely restrict the use of their wares with technological 
protection measures (TPMs) that - in cases like that of iTunes songs - mean the consumer’s 
transaction a license or a lease, not a purchase (Smith, “Federal”). And since the 1840s, repeated 
copyright term extensions have been effectively reintroducing the perpetual copyright regime 
that the 1710 Statute of Anne was meant to curtail (St Clair 54-55). 
 Ironically, the present copyright regime is sufficiently thicker than that of even forty 
years ago that The Medium is the Massage might well be too prohibitively expensive to publish 
today, composed as it is not only of McLuhan’s words but of photographs, art images, film and 
television screen frames, and song lyrics. All these require licensing permission to reprint; just 
the two lines from Bob Dylan’s song alone would now run up a licensing fee of about $4000. 
What, then, of the copyright status of my Connect presentation? As the university I teach 
at, AU owns the copyright in all intellectual property I produce for the institution - with the 
significant exception of research. The Marburg web-conference is research, therefore my 
intellectual property. Adobe claims no copyright in the user content it hosts - but it does reserve 
the right to respond to “clear notices of copyright infringement” by its users, under the provisions 
of US copyright laws, international IP treaties, and “applicable local laws.” Adobe Connect’s 
terms of service, in fact, include detailed instructions to follow “if you believe that your work has 
been used or copied in a way that constitutes copyright infringement and such infringement is 
hosted on the Services” (“Terms”). So if a third party - a Marburg audience member, for 
instance, or someone with whom the recording’s link was shared - finds reason in my 
presentation to allege copyright infringement, they could begin a legal action, on the notice of 
which Adobe personnel would respond, whether to notify me, or remove the infringing content, 
or otherwise.  
So the question arises: what third-party intellectual property did my presentation 
appropriate? Fig. 1 shows one example: the screen frame from Videodrome. I also displayed the 
first-edition covers of three of McLuhan’s books, all found online, and a photograph of a DJ 
taken in Toronto by a photographer, unknown to me, who posted it to Flickr (where it no longer 
is archived). In this essay, I also show a further example: a screen frame of the Connect interface, 
which is Adobe’s copyrighted property. But this catalogue doesn’t suddenly mean I owe 
anybody any licensing fees: Canadian copyright law has relatively robust fair dealing provisions, 
especially for teachers and researchers, broadly defined. If Criterion, the Canadian distributor of 
Videodrome, discovered my usage - either in Connect or on the page above - and deemed it 
objectionable, the onus would be on me to claim fair dealing, which would be a straightforward 
enough case of it, given the context. Since thousands of screen frame images result in a Google 
search for Videodrome, and thousands of film clips result in a Youtube search, the distributor 
might well be required to explain what’s specifically objectionable about my use of one still 
image. (Copyright is quite regularly enforced by litigious rights-holders as a form of censorship, 
as seen in the legacy of J.D. Salinger’s estate.) That said, if this scenario were to move from a 
cease-and-desist letter to a court proceeding, I would have to seriously consider whether the 
rewards would outweigh the risks - and this would depend on first finding out whether AU 
would, as an institution, support my defence. What is also unclear to me is the role potentially to 
be played by the hosting firm, Adobe - would they get any say in whether to let my recording 
abide on their server? (Copyright has tended to cultivate vigilance and conservatism among web 
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service host firms - note the regularity with which Youtube videos vanish, replaced by 
explanations that the content had infringed copyright.) 
But because of the highly restricted and time-limited character of the web-conference, 
and the similarly restricted circulation and currency of this book of proceedings (fantastic as it is, 
don’t get me wrong), such a scenario is quite comfortably remote, especially amidst so much 
evidence of more readily available parallel content on the public Internet. That particular node of 
my dubjection is relatively safe and secure and infinitely repeatable, for the time being. The 
more our self-presentations and self-representations become dubjects, now ephemeral, now 
eternal nodes in a media ecology of rapidly “augmenting” reality in which the corporeal and the 
digital are increasingly difficult to disentangle from each other - the more vigilant we need to be 
about the material conditions and institutional regimes these dubjects travel and occupy.  
One day while we were staying in Ontario, my father-in-law played for us a Youtube 
video that had been filmed by the county’s health office. It was a professionally made and 
poignant portrait of my parents-in-law as they coped with my mother-in-law’s terminal illness, 
and received the supportive, palliative care of the health office’s nurses and assistants. My 
father-in-law was very proud of it and shared the link with many friends and family members. 
His wife died this [that] summer. Reflecting on that video amidst this research, I called up the 
link a couple of days ago. “This video has been removed by the user,” the black screen read, 
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